During Ralph Hasenhuttl’s second season at RB Leipzig, an intriguing tactic was employed in possession.
Heralded for their quintessentially German, vertical brand of football, Leipzig competed against the more established names in the Bundesliga, forcing their way in as an astute, up and coming club.
Hasenhuttl led Leipzig to an impressive second-place finish during his maiden campaign, and in the following year, they finished in sixth after also being involved in the Champions League.
The principles of play did not waver despite Leipzig’s participation in European football’s most illustrious club competition: high-intensity pressing off the ball, penetrative passes through the lines, and relentless work ethic against in defensive transition. The common theme across the two seasons was that Leipzig were better out of possession than they were in it.
What did alter in the second season, though, was how their pressing high up the pitch was initiated. While the likes of Yussuf Poulsen and Timo Werner, supplemented by energetic attacking midfielders Emil Forsberg and Marcel Sabitzer, worked hard to cut off passing angles for opposition defenders and break play up in advanced areas, a slightly less glamorous approach was employed.
Hasenhuttl instructed his defensive players to firstly scan for a line-breaking pass, either to Naby Keita or Diego Demme in holding midfield or to the two aforementioned playmakers, who drifted into halfspaces to align themselves with Hasenhuttl’s narrow 4-2-2-2 shape.
However, if either of the double pivot had been marked out of the game, and no passing lane presented itself, the alternative was to play a long, high ball up into the final third, commonly into wide areas. Poulsen and Werner pulled away into the path of these passes upfield and attempted to win aerial duels. More often than not, it appeared as though Leipzig had launched a pass 40 or 50 yards up the pitch in a hopeless attempt to progress play. However, losing the ball in the opponents’ final third was a perverse way of prompting Leipzig’s most effective skill: gegenpressing.
Once possession had been surrendered, and the opposition reclaimed the ball deep in their own half, Leipzig would swarm in an organised, intense fashion. The two narrow playmakers would push high up to limit the ball-player’s options in possession, while the two forwards were able to panic their opponent with aggressive pressing at different angles. Leipzig lost the ball on the second-most occasions in the Bundesliga in 2016/17 but worked relentlessly hard to win it back – particularly in advanced areas – with a challenge intensity of 7.1, bettered only by Bayern Munich.
Upon retrieving possession, there was a chance to drive at a disorganised defence with bodies high up the pitch. Having suffocated the opposition back-line, starved them of clear passing options, and forced them to either return the long ball or cede possession in a dangerous area, Leipzig forced turnovers.
Hasenhuttl’s impetus on pressing has been prevalent throughout his top-flight managerial career: his Ingolstadt team were hard workers but sat a little deeper, Leipzig were energetic and bursting with youthful exuberance, and now Southampton are still getting to grips with his approach.
There was a clear switch in fundamental tactics when Hasenhuttl replaced Mark Hughes. A more disciplined, physically-exerting philosophy was implemented, and Southampton pressed high up the pitch with the security of a five-man defence and, commonly, a three-man midfield behind them.
With no pre-season under his belt, it was hard for Hasenhuttl to fully teach his new charges about the strategy by which he is keen for them to abide. Some players have never previously worked in pressing systems, while many of the group that he inherited have been moved on.
However, we are seeing the hallmarks of a Hasenhuttl team this season – even if it has been rather ugly at times. Southampton were outdone by Burnley, narrowly defeated by Liverpool, but most recently came away with a 2-0 win over Brighton. It wasn’t a pretty game, but it was a pivotal win against 10 men.
Individual mistakes and lapses of concentration have largely cost Saints. The three goals that they conceded at Burnley were feeble, while at least one of the two against Liverpool was avoidable. However, what has been more concerning for many is the style which has been employed; the press is still intense, and Saints are still getting the ball forward when possible, but there appears to have been a more languid approach from deep, with long passes to the final third favoured instead of penetrative, vertical balls into the midfielders or attackers.
As was the case at Leipzig, Hasenhuttl is favouring long balls to initiate a gegenpress. The statistics back this up: Southampton have played more long passes (177) than any other team in the Premier League so far this season. However, of these balls into advanced areas, just 48.6% have been successful – the 19th-worst return in the division, just ahead of Arsenal.
While it is easy to interpret this success rate as a negative – Hasenhuttl will undoubtedly want his men to be a little more accurate with their balls out from the back – it is hardly atypical of his approach. The difference, currently, is in the quality of players whom he could call upon at Leipzig in comparison to at Southampton.
While sought-after strikers like Werner and Poulsen were capable of providing Hasenhuttl’s team with a ruthless partnership upon the retrieval of possession, Saints’ lack of cutting edge in the final third has been documented for many years now. Their interception rate of 51.34 per game in the opening exchanges of the season is higher than any other Premier League side; it is more about what the team does with the ball, rather than without it, even with the dearth of reliable defensive players in the ranks considered.
Southampton, based on statistical analysis across the opening three fixtures, should not be sat in 18th place. Their 5.4 expected points total is, somewhat surprisingly, the fourth-best in the Premier League, with Manchester City, Manchester United and Liverpool the only teams above them. Haphazard defending and wayward finishing at critical moments – best exemplified by the Burnley game – are the two elements that have cost Southampton, rather than Hasenhuttl’s style of play. The team’s expected goals against stat comes in at 2.11 – the second-lowest in the league behind Manchester United – and yet they have shipped five already.
There is definite room for improvement, and in decisive moments, Southampton need to step up. Kevin Danso’s arrival at the club ought to add a greater presence to the back-line, and he is rather more suited to Hasenhuttl’s style than Jannik Vestergaard, who has been at fault for at least two goals already this season.
Meanwhile, at the other end, it has been a tale of profligacy. Moussa Djenepo and Nathan Redmond scored goals of two different styles against Brighton, but it is the likes of Che Adams and Danny Ings who must step up and ensure that Saints do not rue missed opportunities at this early stage.
Each of the above players listed is under the age of 27, though, and the early signs have generally been positive, despite some scrappy affairs and dismal defending. This is an incredibly young group of players – the average age of Southampton’s starting line-ups this season is 24.1 – and affording them the time to continue adjusting to Hasenhuttl’s intricate tactical demands will be necessary if Saints are to enjoy success this season.
